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The Performance Flow Relationship in the Mutual Fund Industry
ABSTRACT
The relationship between the performance of mutual funds and their subsequent
growth is examined. The focus of our paper is on the inﬂuence of the position of a fund
within its family. So far only the inﬂuence of the position of a fund within its segment
on its subsequent inﬂows has been considered. Our empirical study of the US mutual
fund market shows that fund growth depends on the relative position of a fund within
its segment and within its family. This leads to important incentives for fund managers.
2I. Introduction
There is a broad empirical literature looking at the relationship between the performance
of mutual funds and subsequent inﬂows of new money into these funds.1 The studies ﬁnd
that the performance ﬂow relationship (PFR) is positive and convex. The best performing
funds in a market segment get the lion’s share of inﬂows, whereas bad and mediocre funds
hardly diﬀer in terms of net ﬂows.2
In this paper we argue that funds not only compete for ﬂows within their market segment,
but also within their fund family.3 We expect the position of a fund within its family to
determine inﬂows because fund families advertise their star funds (see, e.g., Jain and Wu
(2000)). If advertisement is productive, we expect top funds within a family to grow faster
than other funds.
There are no studies looking at the inﬂuence of the position of a fund within its family on
its subsequent growth. Ours is the ﬁrst study to address this issue: Is there an inﬂuence
of a fund’s relative performance within its family on its inﬂows? And if so, how does this
relationship look like?
Answering this question is relevant because of two reasons: First, it allows us to better
understand the determinants of fund growth and therefore the behavior of mutual fund
investors. Second, the inﬂuence of the performance within a family on fund growth creates
incentives for fund managers and might therefore inﬂuence their trading strategies. The
1The very ﬁrst papers are Spitz (1970) and Smith (1978). Recent studies include Ippolito (1992), Patel,
Zeckhauser, and Hendricks (1994), Roston (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Goetzmann and Peles (1997),
Sirri and Tufano (1998), Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2002), and Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004). DelGuercio
and Tkac (2002) and Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2003) look at the performance ﬂow relationship in the
pension fund and hedge fund markets, respectively.
2A segment is deﬁned as the entirety of all funds having comparable investment objectives, e.g., Growth,
Growth and Income
3A fund family is deﬁned as the entirety of all funds managed by the same mutual fund management
company, e.g. Janus or Fidelity.
3incentives arising from a fund’s position within its segment have been studied by, e.g.,
Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), and Chevalier and Ellison (1999). The inﬂuence of the
relative position within the family on fund behavior is examined in Kempf and Ruenzi
(2004b).
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II describes the methodology. Section III presents
the data and summary statistics. Section IV contains the results of our empirical study and
stability tests. Section V concludes.
II. Methodology
We want to explain fund growth, FLOWi,t, by the relative position of a fund within its
segment and within its family in the previous year. A simpliﬁed framework to address this
issue is
FLOWi,t = f(SegPerfi,t−1,FamPerfi,t−1,Controls).
The position of a fund within its segment and within its family is denoted by SegPerfi,t−1
and FamPerfi,t−1, respectively. Controls denotes a set of control variables that have proven
to be relevant factors inﬂuencing fund growth.
We now turn to a more detailed description of our model and the variables contained therein.
In Section II.A we describe how we construct the dependent variable FLOWi,t. Section II.B
describes how we construct the performance variables SegPerfi,t−1 and FamPerfi,t−1.
Section II.C describes the control variables. The empirical model is detailed in Section II.D.
4A. Dependent Variable
Due to data limitations we do not observe inﬂows into a fund directly. Instead, we have to





TNAi,t is the total net asset value of fund i in year t and ri,t is the total rate of return
of fund i in year t. FLOWi,t reﬂects the growth of the fund that is not due to the rate of
return earned on the assets under management, but due to new external money. FLOWi,t
is a conservative measure of the inﬂows into a fund. It implicitly assumes that ﬂows occur
at the end of the year and that all dividends are re-invested in the same fund. Sirri and
Tufano (1998) show that the results of their study are not sensitive to this assumption.
B. Performance Variables
Many diﬀerent performance measures are suggested in the literature to explain fund inﬂows.5
We can classify performance measures as ordinal measures (ranks) and cardinal measures.
Studies comparing ordinal and cardinal measures ﬁnd that ordinal measures are able to
explain fund growth much better than cardinal measures (see, e.g., Patel, Zeckhauser, and
Hendricks (1994), Myers (2001), and Navone (2002)). These results conﬁrm the ﬁndings of
the survey studies by Capon, Fitzsimons, and Weingarten (1994) and Capon, Fitzsimons,
and Prince (1996). The latter two studies ﬁnd that fund rankings are the most important
4This procedure is used by Chevalier and Ellison (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998), among other.
5Raw and/or Excess-Returns over the risk-free rate or some broad market-index are used by Ippolito
(1992), Patel, Zeckhauser, and Hendricks (1994), Roston (1996), Goetzmann and Peles (1997), Gruber (1996),
Berkowitz and Kotowitz (2000) and Jain and Wu (2000) as cardinal measure and by Patel, Zeckhauser,
and Hendricks (1994), Sirri and Tufano (1998), and Fant and O’Neal (2000) as ordinal measures. Risk-
adjusted performance measures like Jensen’s Alpha or multi-factor Alphas are used by Ippolito (1992), Patel,
Zeckhauser, and Hendricks (1994), Harless and Peterson (1998), Gruber (1996), Berkowitz and Kotowitz
(2000), Jain and Wu (2000), Nanda, Wang, and Zheng (2004), and Lynch and Musto (2003). Fant and
O’Neal (2000) and Del Guercio and Tkac (2002) use performance ranks based on Jensen’s Alpha.
5information as well as selection criterion for fund investors. Therefore, in the following we
only use ordinal measures, i.e. ranks based on diﬀerent performance measures, to explain
fund growth.
As there is no clear evidence in the literature which performance measure our ranks should
be based on, we use three diﬀerent measures.









i,t denotes the rate of return on the risk-free asset in year t and STDi,t denotes the
annualized return standard deviation of fund i in year t.
Second, we use the Fama and French (1993) methodology to estimate three-factor alphas:
ri,m − rf
m = α3F
i + βi1 · RMRFm + βi2 · SMBm + βi3 · HMLm + εi,m
ri,m is the rate of return of fund i in month m, rf
m is the risk-free rate in month m and
RMRFm is the excess-return of the market over the risk free rate in month m. SMBm
and HMLm denote the rate of return on portfolios that mimick the size-factor and the
book-to-market factor, respectively. The regression is run for every fund i and every year t
separately in order to get a time series of yearly observations of the three-factor alphas.
Finally, we estimate the Carhart (1997) four-factor model to generate four-factor alphas.
The regression-equation is the same as for the three-factor model presented above, except
that we add the momentum factor MOMm:
ri,m − rf
m = α4F
i + βi1 · RMRFm + βi2 · SMBm + βi3 · HMLm + βi4 · MOMm + εi,m.
We construct segment ranks by ordering all funds belonging to a speciﬁc market segment
in a given year according to each of the described measures separately. We then assign a
rank-number RANK to them. This rank-number is normalized so that ranks are evenly
distributed between 0 and 1. The best fund gets assigned the rank 1. RANKPERF
i,t denotes
6the rank of fund i in year t within its segment based on the performance measure PERF.
PERF can be SR, if the ranking is based on the Sharpe Ratio, and 3F and 4F, if it is
based on the three- and four-factor alpha, respectively.
The relative success of a fund within its family is denoted by RoRPERF
i,t . This family rank
can be based on one of the three segment rankings described above. To construct RoRPERF
i,t ,
we order all funds within a family according to their rank within their respective segment,
RANKPERF
i,t . Based on this segment ranking we then assign a new rank number to them.
Therefore it is a Rank-of-Rank. This method is sensible because fund families usually have
funds in diﬀerent segments and these segments are characterized by diﬀerent risk-return
characteristics. Therefore, we cannot simply compare the Sharpe Ratios or factor alphas of
the funds within a family.
C. Control Variables
Funds might beneﬁt from positive spillover eﬀects if there are other funds in the same
family that show a top performance (see, e.g., Ivkovic (2003) and Nanda, Wang, and Zheng
(2004)). To control for this eﬀect, we add the variable STARi,t to our model. We calculate
this ratio by ﬁrst counting the number of funds in fund i’s family that were among the top
5% within their segment. This number is then divided by the total number of funds in the
same fund’s family to provide the star ratio.6
Ippolito (1992) and Sirri and Tufano (1998) ﬁnd a marginal inﬂuence of risk on fund ﬂows.
We follow their approach and include the annualized standard deviation of monthly returns,
STDi,t, in the model as a measure of the riskiness of the fund.
6We use this ratio rather than a dummy indicating the existence of another top performer in the family
(as, e.g., in Ivkovic (2003)) because the families in our sample are quite large and the probability of having
a star in any of the segments therefore is quite high. For example, more than 40% of all families have a
top-5% fund in at least one segment. This number rises to 55% if we look at top-10% funds.
7We also include the growth of the fund in the previous year, FLOWi,t−1, to control for
possible autocorrelation in fund ﬂows (see, e.g., Zeckhauser, Patel, and Hendricks (1991)).
This autocorrelation might be due to other fund-speciﬁc characteristics that we do not
control for and that do not change over time. It could also be due to a status-quo bias. If
investors suﬀer from a status-quo bias they tend to repeat an investment decision made in
the past, even if this decision is not optimal any more. This kind of behavior leads to a
positive dependence of current inﬂows on past inﬂows (see, e.g., Kempf and Ruenzi (2004a)).
We include the log of the fund size, ln(TNAi,t), because it is probably more diﬃcult for
large funds to grow than for small funds (see, e.g., Chevalier and Ellison (1997), and Sirri
and Tufano (1998)).
Our model also includes the log of the age of a fund, lnAGEi,t. Chevalier and Ellison (1997)
show that young funds behave diﬀerently from old funds. Diﬀerences in the investment stra-
tegy might inﬂuence investors’ demand. Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) and Del Guercio
and Tkac (2002) ﬁnd a negative inﬂuence of a fund’s age on fund growth.
To control for the inﬂuence of fees we follow the standard procedure in the literature (see,
e.g., Khorana and Servaes (2003)) and assume an average holding period of 7 years for fund
investors. Our measure for the total fee burden, FEESi,t, is therefore constructed as the
sum of the expense ratio and 1/7 of all loads charged by the fund.
We also add the turnover ratio of the fund, TOi,t, to examine whether investors prefer
actively managed funds. While Woerheide (1982) ﬁnds no signiﬁcant inﬂuence of the trading
activity on fund growth, more recent studies like Rockinger (1995) and Bergstresser and
Poterba (2002) report a positive inﬂuence.
FLOW(Seg)i,t and FLOW(Fam)i,t are deﬁned as the growth rates of fund i’s segment and
family, respectively. The growth of the segment and family is calculated net of the growth
of the fund analyzed. By including FLOW(Seg)i,t we control for segment-speciﬁc eﬀects
that might inﬂuence the growth of the funds belonging to this speciﬁc segment. A positive
8inﬂuence of segment growth on fund growth is documented in, e.g., Sirri and Tufano (1998),
and Fant and O’Neal (2000). FLOW(Fam)i,t is added to control for family speciﬁc factors
like marketing eﬀorts boosting the whole family. Other family speciﬁc factors are additional
services oﬀered by the fund company like, e.g., telephone hotlines or the possibility of deﬁned
contribution plans (see, e.g., Harless and Peterson (1998)).
We also include the log of the size of the family, lnTNA(Fam)i,t. The total net assets under
management (TNA) in the family are calculated net of the TNA of the fund analyzed. This
variable is a proxy for the visibility of a fund family.
Finally, we also include a set of dummy variables Dj that take on the value 1 if an observation
is from year j and 0 otherwise. The dummy variables control for year-speciﬁc, economy-wide
eﬀects in our pooled regression.7
D. Empirical Model
We know from the literature that the PFR in the market segment is convex. We therefore
follow the approach suggested by, e.g., Sirri and Tufano (1998) and Fant and O’Neal (2000).
They apply a piecewise-linear speciﬁcation: Slope coeﬃcients are estimated for the bottom
quintile, the three middle quintiles, and the top quintile of the fractional ranked performance
separately. The complete model using their technique then reads:
FLOWi,t = β1a · LOW(Seg)i,t−1 + β1b · MID(Seg)i,t−1 + β1c · TOP(Seg)i,t−1
+β2a · LOW(Fam)i,t−1 + β2b · MID(Fam)i,t−1 + β2c · TOP(Fam)i,t−1
+γ1 · STARi,t−1 + γ2 · STDi,t−1 + γ3 · FLOWi,t−1
+γ4 · lnTNAi,t−1 + γ5 · lnAGEi,t−1 + γ6 · FEESi,t−1 + γ7 · TOi,t−1
+γ8 · FLOW(Seg)i,t + γ9 · FLOW(Fam)i,t + γ10 · lnTNA(Fam)i,t−1
7Rockinger (1995) argues that in some years the aggregate liquidity in the market is higher than in others




















i,t−1 − (LOW(Seg)i,t−1 + MID(Seg)i,t−1)
TOP(Fam)i,t−1 = RoR
Perf
i,t−1 − (LOW(Fam)i,t−1 + MID(Fam)i,t−1).
The piecewise linear regression methodology allows us to estimate diﬀerent slope coeﬃcients
for the bottom quintile, the middle quintiles, and the top quintile. For example, the estimate
of the slope in the bottom quintile of the PFR in the segment is given by β1a. Note that
we include all controls that are relevant for investment decisions in year t, but whose values
are unknown at the beginning of the year, as lagged variables.
III. Data and Summary Statistics
We use data on all US equity funds from the CRSP survivorship free mutual fund database.8
The CRSP database contains data on monthly total returns, the fund management com-
pany, the year of origin, and other characteristics of the fund. We use the Strategic Insight
Objectives (SI) of the funds to deﬁne the market segments. This provides us with 38 diﬀer-
ent segments. As the SI classiﬁcation is available from 1993 on, our study starts in 1993. It
ends in 2001 leaving us with nine years of data.
8Source: CRSP
TM, Center for Research in Security Prices. Graduate School of Business, The University
of Chicago. Used with permission. All rights reserved. crsp.uchicago.edu. For a more detailed description of
the CRSP database, see Carhart (1997) and Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2001).
10To calculate the three- and four-factor alphas described in Section II.B we use the returns
of the respective factor portfolios provided by Kenneth R. French.9
As we use previous year’s performance to explain inﬂows, only funds that are at least 2
years old in any given year are included. We restrict our dataset by excluding outliers: We
exclude funds with a growth rate of more than 500% and funds with a TNA of less than
10 Million USD.10 Furthermore, we also exclude all families and segments with less than
20 funds. This ensures that the rank-numbers deﬁned above are smoothly distributed. Our
ﬁnal sample consists of 10,068 fund year observations. Summary statistics of our resulting
sample are presented in Table I.
+++ PLEASE INSERT TABLE I ABOUT HERE +++
The number of funds in our sample grows from 117 in 1993 to 2,688 in 2001. These numbers
exaggerate the growth of the fund industry because the share of excluded funds belonging
to segments and families with less than 20 funds is much larger in the earlier years of our
sample. The average number of funds per year is 1,119. The size, TNAi,t, of the average
fund in our sample is 1,124 million USD, with a maximum of 1,829 million USD in 1995 and
a minimum of about 756 million USD in 2001. The mean growth rate due to new money in
our sample is 10.74 % p.a.. The age of the mean fund is 10.38 years.
9The factor returns are available for downloading at Kenneth R. French’s Homepage
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french.
10We also followed Bergstresser and Poterba (2002) and only excluded fund years in which funds grew
more than tenfold. Results remain virtually unchanged. We also set the growth rate of funds growing by
more than 500% equal to 5. Results do not change.
11IV. Empirical Results
A. Performance Flow Relationship in the Segment
In this (mainly reproductive) section, we estimate the model for the PFR in the segment.
We estimate Model (1), but leave aside the inﬂuence of the position of a fund within its
family for the moment. Results are presented in Table II. We do not report the estimates
for the yearly dummies for sake of brevity.
+++ PLEASE INSERT TABLE II ABOUT HERE +++
We ﬁnd evidence for a positive and convex inﬂuence of past performance on fund growth,
irrespective of what performance measure we use for calculating ranks. Thereby, we support
the results of earlier studies. Investors chase past winners, but do not sell past losers to the
same extent.
The impact of the other control variables is the same as in earlier studies: We ﬁnd a positive
and highly signiﬁcant inﬂuence of the star ratio, STARi,t−1, indicating that spill-over eﬀects
are very important. The inﬂuence of risk, measured by STDi,t−1, on inﬂows is insigniﬁcant
for the Sharpe Ratio (which already includes STDi,t−1 in the denominator) speciﬁcation.
STDi,t−1 has an statistically signiﬁcant negative inﬂuence in the factor alpha speciﬁcations.
This indicates that investors prefer less risky funds. The inﬂuence of previous year’s fund
growth, FLOWi,t−1, is positive and highly signiﬁcant. This is consistent with the existence
of a status-quo bias in the mutual fund market. There is also a strong negative inﬂuence of
fund size, lnTNAi,t−1, on growth. Large funds grow slower than small funds. The inﬂuence
of the fund’s age, lnAGEi,t−1, is negative, but only marginally signiﬁcant. Old funds tend
to grow slower than young funds. Fees, FEESi,t−1, have a negative impact on fund growth.
Investors are fee-sensitive. Turnover, TOi,t−1, has no notable impact. Investors do not seem
to strongly prefer an active management style. The growth rates of the segment and the
family a fund belongs to (FLOW(Seg)i,t and FLOW(Fam)i,t, respectively) have a positive
12and signiﬁcant inﬂuence on fund growth. This indicates that further segment- and family-
speciﬁc characteristics are important for fund investors. We also ﬁnd a positive inﬂuence
of the size of the fund’s family, lnTNA(Fam)i,t−1, on its growth. This suggests that larger
families enjoy a better visibility. Overall, we conﬁrm the results of earlier studies. We will not
report estimates of the control variables in the following tables; they remain qualitatively
unchanged.11
The R2 using Sharpe Ratio ranks is 22.49%, while it is only below 18% for the factor alpha
ranks. Ranks based on Sharpe Ratios clearly explain fund growth better than ranks based
on factor alphas. Therefore, we use ranks based on Sharpe Ratios in the remainder of the
paper.
B. Performance Flow Relationship in the Family and in the Segment
We now analyze the inﬂuence of a fund’s position within its family on its subsequent growth.
We estimate our fully speciﬁed Model (1). Results are presented in Table III.
+++ PLEASE INSERT TABLE III ABOUT HERE +++
We still ﬁnd strong evidence for a convex PFR in the segment, even after controlling for the
inﬂuence of a fund’s position within its family. All of the piecewise linear slope coeﬃcients
for the segment PFR are positive and highly signiﬁcant.
Most importantly, we ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant evidence for a convex PFR in the family.
The slope coeﬃcient for the top quintile, TOP(Fam), is positive and statistically signiﬁcant.
The other slope coeﬃcients, LOW(Fam) and MID(Fam), are insigniﬁcant. This indicatefs
that it matters for fund growth whether a fund belongs to the top quintile. However, it does
not matter whether a fund belongs to the lowest or to the mid quintiles. This is consistent
11The complete tables - and also all other results that are not reported in the following - are available
from the authors upon request.
13with our view that mutual fund families promote their best funds. Therefore, top funds
within families experience larger inﬂows. As only top funds will be promoted, it only matters
to reach the top quintile. This suggests not to model diﬀerent slope coeﬃcients (as with the
piecewise linear speciﬁcation used above), but rather to look at a level eﬀect of moving up
into the top ranks. Therefore, we estimate the following modiﬁed model:
FLOWi,t = β1a · LOW(Seg) + β1b · MID(Seg) + β1c · TOP(Seg)
+β3a · DII(Fam) + β3b · DIII(Fam) + β3c · DIV (Fam) + β3d · DV (Fam)
+... (2)
In (2) we replace the three slope coeﬃcients for the family PFR by four dummy variables,
DII(Fam)-DV (Fam). We use dummies to examine the average ﬂow to funds if a fund
is not within the very bottom quintile of the performance ranking. These dummies are
deﬁned as DII(Fam) = 1 if RANK
Perf
i,t−1 ∈]0.2,0.4], and 0 otherwise, DIII(Fam) = 1 if
RANK
Perf
i,t−1 ∈]0.4,0.6], and 0 otherwise, and so on. Note, that in (2) there is no dummy
DI, because this would make the regressors linear dependent. The base inﬂow of the lowest
quintile is reﬂected in the yearly dummies.
The estimates for (2) are again presented in Table III. DV (Fam) is positive and statistically
signiﬁcant, whereas DII(Fam) to DIV (Fam) are insigniﬁcant. There is no inﬂuence of
belonging to a speciﬁc quintile except for the top one. If a fund belongs to the top quintile
in its family, it grows - ceteris paribus - by nearly 7% more than other funds. Given the
average growth rate of 10.74% p.a. (see Table I), this eﬀect is economically very important.
The convexity in the segment PFR still shows up strongly, as indicated by the three positive
and statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcients LOW(Seg) to TOP(Seg).
As a third speciﬁcation we replace the piecewise linear coeﬃcients with quintile dummies
for the segment rank, too. The new segment variables are denoted by DII(Seg)-DV (Seg)
and are deﬁned in the same way as the family dummies above. Our Model (3) reads:
FLOWi,t = β4a · DII(Seg) + β4b · DIII(Seg) + β4c · DIV (Seg) + β4d · DV (Seg)
14+β3a · DII(Fam) + β3b · DIII(Fam) + β3c · DIV (Fam) + β3d · DV (Fam)
+... (3)
Results are presented in Table III and again conﬁrm our earlier ﬁndings. They indicate a
convex PFR in the segment and in the family. However, the R2 in this case is slightly lower
than for Model (2). Thus, a speciﬁcation using piecewise linear coeﬃcients for the segment
PFR and performance dummies for the family PFR is able to explain fund growth best.
In a ﬁnal step we now look at a ﬁner breakdown of the family rank in deciles. This allows
us to gain a more precise understanding on how growth depends on the position of a fund
within its family. Instead of the four dummy variables indicating quintiles in Model (2),
we now use nine dummies, D2(Fam) − D10(Fam), indicating whether a fund belongs to a
speciﬁc performance decile in its family. This extended model reads:




δn · Dn(Fam) + ... (4)
Estimation results for Model (4) are presented in Table III. There is still strong evidence for
a convex PFR in the segment and in the family. In the family, the coeﬃcients for D2(Fam)−
D8(Fam) are all insigniﬁcant. However, the coeﬃcients for D9(Fam) and D10(Fam) are
positive and statistically signiﬁcant at the 5%- and 1%-level, respectively. A fund grows -
ceteris paribus - by 7% more if it belongs to the second best decile, and even by 10% more
if it belongs to the top decile.
Taken together, our results indicate that the PFR is convex in the segment as well as in
the family. The convexity is very pronounced over the whole performance domain in the
segment case. In contrast, in the family case it only seems to matter whether a fund happens
to end up in the top quintile. This result is consistent with the view that the growth of the
top funds in a family is due to advertisements for these funds.
Our result of a convex PFR in the family has important consequences. A convex relationship
between performance and inﬂows leads to interesting incentives for fund managers. This is
15shown in, e.g., Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997) for the
case of the segment rank, RANK
Perf
i,t−1. The contribution of our study is to show that this
convexity also exits with respect to the family rank, RoR
Perf
i,t−1. This should lead to incentives
depending on the position of a fund within its family (see, e.g., Kempf and Ruenzi (2004b)).
Fund managers’ strategies might therefore be inﬂuenced by much more complex incentives
than typically assumed in the literature.
C. Stability Tests
As can be seen from Table I, the year 1993 is characterized by an extreme growth rate of
the fund industry. Therefore we re-estimate the results presented in Table III, but exclude
observations from 1993. Results are presented in Table IV.
+++ PLEASE INSERT TABLE IV ABOUT HERE +++
All results remain very similar. The results of Model (2) for the family PFR are even a little
bit stronger. Thus, our results are not driven by the extraordinary growth of funds in 1993.
In our models we do not use the return of fund i in the year under consideration, ri,t. One
might argue to include ri,t as independent variable because the performance within year
t might already cause external fund growth in the same year. However, there are possible
endogenity problems because ri,t is also used to calculate our dependent variable FLOWi,t.
Despite this potential problem, we follow Sirri and Tufano (1998) and re-estimate our models
with ri,t as additional explanatory variable. Its inﬂuence is always positive and statistically
signiﬁcant; the results regarding the other variables (not reported here) remain very similar.
We follow Sirri and Tufano (1998) by assuming a seven year holding period while con-
structing our fee measure, FEESi,t−1. Barber, Odean, and Zheng (2002) report an average
16holding period of 30 months.12 Therefore, we also do all examinations assuming a holding
period of 30 months. The eﬀect of fees is still signiﬁcantly negative and the inﬂuence of the
other variables also remains qualitatively unchanged (results not reported here).
Our measure for the eﬀect of positive spillovers from other top funds within the family,
STARi,t−1, is calculated by dividing the number of top 5%-funds in the family by the total
number of funds in the family. We also use the top 2.5%-funds and the top 10%-funds to
calculate this ratio instead. Results (not reported here) remain virtually unchanged.
V. Conclusion
Sirri and Tufano (1998), among others, examine the relationship between the relative per-
formance of a fund within its segment and its subsequent growth. They ﬁnd a positive and
convex performance ﬂow relationship (PFR) in the segment.
We extend their analysis and examine the question: Is there an inﬂuence of the relative
position of a fund within its family on its growth? We analyze this question using a broad
sample of US equity mutual funds from 1993 to 2001.
Our main result is that there is a positive and convex relationship between the family rank
of a fund and its subsequent growth. The PFR in the family is convex. The top 20% funds
in a family grow by an additional 6.78% as compared to the other funds in the family after
controlling for their position within their segment.
Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996) have shown that a convex relationship between the
segment rank of a fund and its growth leads to interesting incentives for fund managers.
Our result of a convex PFR in the family, that exists besides the convex PFR in the segment,
should give rise to more complex incentives. Fund managers not only compete against the
12From Shrider (2003), who examines the trading accounts of load-fund investors from a large brokerage
ﬁrm, an average holding period of approximately three years can be calculated.
17other funds within their segment, but also against the other funds within their own family.
Studying the implications stemming from this complex incentive structure oﬀers a promising
avenue for further research.
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22Table I
Summary Statistics
This table presents summary statistics of our dataset covering the years 1993-2001. The
numbers are based on calculations including all U.S. equity mutual funds from the CRSP
database except those with a growth rate of more than 500% and those with total net assets
(TNA) under management of less than 10 Million USD. Funds younger than 2 years and
segments and families containing less than 20 funds are excluded.
Number of Mean TNA Mean Growth Mean Age
Year funds in Mio USD in % in years
1993 117 1,664.2 40.45 11.85
1994 128 1,818.4 16.37 12.22
1995 233 1,828.5 12.75 13.91
1996 411 1,655.0 14.80 13.54
1997 863 1,346.5 17.29 11.42
1998 1,283 1,281.7 10.19 10.60
1999 2,087 1,363.3 10.45 10.01
2000 2,258 930.0 9.56 9.76
2001 2,688 756.4 7.79 9.79
Average 1,119 1,124.2 10.74 10.38
23Table II
Performance Flow Relationship in the Segment
Estimation results from Model (1) as contained in the main text are presented. The inﬂu-
ence of the family position is excluded. Dependent variable in all models is fund growth.
Explanatory variables are contained in Column 1. The number of observations in all models
is 10,068.
Ranks based on
Sharpe Ratio 3-Factor Alpha 4-Factor Alpha
(Perf = SR) (Perf = 3F) (Perf = 4F)
Model (1)
LOW(Seg) 0.3393∗∗∗ 0.2234∗ 0.2911∗∗
MID(Seg) 0.4250∗∗∗ 0.2902∗∗∗ 0.2494∗∗∗
TOP(Seg) 1.2911∗∗∗ 0.7373∗∗∗ 0.7981∗∗∗
STARi,t−1 0.6987∗∗∗ 0.6338∗∗∗ 0.4089∗∗∗
STDi,t−1 −0.0400 −0.1467∗∗ −0.1416∗∗
FLOWi,t−1 0.2214∗∗∗ 0.2410∗∗∗ 0.2429∗∗∗
lnTNAi,t−1 −0.0706∗∗∗ −0.0696∗∗∗ −0.0685∗∗∗
lnAGEi,t−1 −0.0150∗ −0.0082 −0.0087
FEESi,t−1 −3.1249∗∗∗ −3.2893∗∗∗ −3.2626∗∗∗
TOi,t−1 0.0089 0.0109 0.0147∗
FLOW(Seg)i,t 0.0827∗∗∗ 0.0810∗∗∗ 0.0825∗∗∗
FLOW(Fam)i,t 0.0240∗∗∗ 0.0315∗∗∗ 0.0359∗∗∗
lnTNA(Fam)i,t−1 0.0254∗∗∗ 0.0334∗∗∗ 0.0332∗∗∗
R2 22.49% 17.99% 17.27%
∗∗∗,∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level respectively.
24Table III
Performance Flow Relationship in the Family and in the Segment
Estimation results from models (1) - (4) contained in the main text are presented. Dependent
variable in all models is fund growth. Explanatory variables are contained in Column 1.
Control variables not reported are the lagged star ratio, lagged standard deviation, lagged
ﬂows, lagged size and age of the fund, lagged fees, lagged turnover rate, segment- and family
growth, and the size of the fund family. The performance is measured using ranks based on
Sharpe Ratios. The number of observations in all models is 10,068.
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
LOW(Seg) 0.3065∗∗ 0.5694∗∗∗ 0.4676∗∗∗
MID(Seg) 0.3833∗∗∗ 0.3513∗∗∗ 0.3708∗∗∗










DIV (Fam) 0.0151 0.0626∗∗










R2 22.49% 22.64% 22.21% 22.69%
∗∗∗,∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level respectively.
25Table IV
Results Excluding Observations from 1993
Estimation results from models (1) - (4) contained in the main text are presented. Dependent
variable in all models is fund growth. Explanatory variables are contained in Column 1.
Control variables not reported are the lagged star ratio, lagged standard deviation, lagged
ﬂows, lagged size and age of the fund, lagged fees, lagged turnover rate, segment- and family
growth, and the size of the fund family. The performance is measured using ranks based on
Sharpe Ratios. We exclude all observations from the year 1993. The number of observations
in all models is 9,951.
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)
LOW(Seg) 0.2951∗ 0.5604∗∗∗ 0.4569∗∗∗
MID(Seg) 0.3765∗∗∗ 0.3437∗∗∗ 0.3655∗∗∗










DIV (Fam) 0.0638∗∗ 0.0626∗∗










R2 22.30% 22.42% 21.98% 22.48%
∗∗∗,∗∗, and ∗ denote statistical signiﬁcance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%-level respectively.
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